A DEADLY GAP: By the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton with Introduction by Paul Flum

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman of 9/11 Commission

Goals for Americans Foundation is honored to be associated with the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and former U.S. Representative from Indiana.

As Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, he is acutely aware of the great security challenges to the United States. None is more grave than the possiiblity of a nuclear terrorist attack.

Goals for Americans Foundation is honored to present the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton’s essay on A Deadly Gap here.

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The greatest security challenge of our times is the prospect of a terrorist attack on an American city with a nuclear weapon. Yet there is a deadly gap between the enormity of this threat, and the scope and pace of our action to combat it.

We know that al Qaeda and its ideological allies have the intent to carry out a nuclear terrorist attack. Osama bin Laden has spoken of his desire to bring a “Hiroshima” to the United States, and even sought a fatwa, or religious edict, justifying the murder of up to 10 million Americans. Unlike the former Soviet Union, suicidal terrorists cannot be deterred by the prospect of an American retaliatory strike. What we can do is prevent terrorists from obtaining the materials needed to build a nuclear weapon, most notably highly enriched uranium.

Osama bin Laden has spoken of his desire to bring a “Hiroshima” to the United States

A likely source for terrorists seeking to buy or steal nuclear materials is the former Soviet Union. There are 600 tons of nuclear materials in Russia alone, and much of it is in facilities in need of security and accounting upgrades. Estimates are that there is enough inadequately secured material to produce thousands of nuclear weapons, and there is a further risk from unemployed scientists with nuclear know-how, who might sell their services to the highest bidder.

Dots indicate missile fields in Russia
& former Soviet Union

The good news is that the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program — often referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar” program — has made inroads over the last decade. Nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; over 6,000 nuclear warheads have been deactivated; and there have been security upgrades at over 70 sites in the former Soviet Union. But given the success of the program and the work that remains to be done, CTR must be expanded and accelerated. We need to dismantle more weapons, support security and accounting upgrades for nuclear materials around the globe, and provide re-employment for scientists with nuclear expertise.

A budget increase is one place to start. The United States spent $1 billion on CTR last year — a significant amount, but only a quarter of 1percent of the annual U.S. defense budget. Based on the recommendations of the Baker-Cutler Commission, upon which I served, we should raise spending to $3 billion per year, with a target of spending $35 billion over 10 years. Money, of course, won’t surmount all of the obstacles in front of us, but it will enhance our efforts, while signaling that Nunn-Lugar is a top priority.

Flags of G-8 Nations:
United States, Canada, Russia,
Japan, decorative flag, France,
Italy, Britain, Germany

CTR must also be a greater diplomatic priority. It should be at the top of the agenda in our relationship with Russia. President Bush should set target goals for success, and appoint a senior official responsible for meeting those goals; we should encourage the Russians to do likewise. Meanwhile, other states must do more as well. The Group of eight industrialized democracies (G-8) should make nuclear security a central focus, and our friends and allies should be encouraged to increase their contributions.

There are several other obstacles to success. Within our own bureaucracy, we need better coordination amongst the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. In Russia, we need access to more sensitive sites, and the Russians in turn want access to American nuclear sites. There are concerns about potential liability in the event of accidents. The Congress also often imposes certification requirements that tie funding for CTR to a recipient country’s performance in areas like human rights or arms control, making it much more difficult for the President to take necessary action to secure these nuclear materials.

Given the threat, these obstacles must not delay action and progress. It will take sustained presidential leadership and robust congressional action to ensure that CTR is adequately funded; that nuclear security is a top international priority; and that legal and bureaucratic impediments do not get in the way of the security of the American people. It is also past time for the American public to be brought into the dialogue on securing loose nuclear materials; this is not merely an issue to be debated by scientists and military experts.

Protecting Americans from nuclear terrorism rises above politics. The 9/11 attacks killed thousands of Americans and devastated the country; imagine the impact of an attack that kills hundreds of thousands. If the terrorists cannot get their hands on this material, they cannot build a nuclear weapon. Ten years of CTR have demonstrated an approach that works. We must now make it a higher priority. How will history judge us if we fail to do so?

June 29, 2005 | Filed Under GFA