Allawi Interview

Ali Allawi

Ali Allawi Book

Allawi Interview
05/15/2007

“So a solution will require a really very very pronounced commitment on the part of the United States…a political and a diplomatic solution that would try to balance the changes in Iraq that…cannot be reversed without a great deal of turmoil inside the country. Try to balance these with the interests of each of the regional powers and come up with a kind of optimized solution which may require I think the appointment of what I’ll call a super ambassador who has enough power and enough skill to be able to negotiate or to calibrate the needed policy changes.”
- Ali Allawi speaking from London

The following Goals for Americans Foundation Interview with
Ali Allawi, former Defense Minister of Iraq, was conducted by Mark Bruzonsky on May 6th 2007.

This is Mark Bruzonsky in Washington and I’m speaking with Ali Allawi, who is today in London.Mark Bruzonsky: Mr. Allawi, as I just mentioned to you, your book tour, and your book and your views and the speeches you gave have caused a great deal of interest here in the United States. If you had an opportunity to speak to the president of the United States for a few minutes privately, what would you tell him at this point about what changes need to be made in American policy in view of your experiences?

Ali Allawi

Ali Allawi: Well I think what I would tell him is that wittingly or otherwise is that the United States has really affected in a very dramatic way the balance of power both inside Iraq and in the Middle East, generally, and unless you undertake the remedial policy to resolve the consequences of these actions, that it is unlikely that a unilateral or even a one dimensional military-based policy would succeed. There are just too many consequences of this unusual action. And this would require a very significant increase in the political and dramatic commitment on the part of the United States to resolving this crisis.

MB: Well, could you be a little more specific…. What would you actually advocate the United States specifically do – rather than the policy that we are pursuing at the moment?

AA: Well the policy now is to basically try to get regional powers to confront the political process in Iraq and to basically to agree that whatever emerged out of the various elections that we’ve had should be there are connections we’ve had is somehow acceptable to them. But the reality of the matter is that it’s not. Now that doesn’t mean to disparage the political outcome in Iraq. The Constitutional election – the elections were held according to Constitutional means and by and large they reflect the sectarian ethnic divisions in the country . But a political resolution in Iraq based on ethnic and sectarian concentration is unacceptable in the region. And maybe unacceptable within Iraq itself even though it might have a plurality.

And the reason for that is very simple, it’s that in each of the surrounding countries there are important effects on their own national security by the changes that have taken place in Iraq and unless you are able to contain them and to resolve them, in ways that are at least minimally damaging to these countries, you are unlikely to get a long-term commitment to a political settlement in Iraq.

For example the Turks feeling threatened by what is likely to happen in Iraq…mainly an increased degree of autonomy perhaps leading to a confederale arrangement for the Kurds. And at the same time, the Saudis, they feel that a Shiite government in Iraq will have a profoundly destabilizing influence on their own Shiite populations. Jordan probably feels threatened by the changes in Iraq’s economic and external relations to its own detriment and therefore wants to undertake remedial changes that will allow it to at least contain the shock to it of reducing its dependence on trying to trade with Iraq.

And so on down the line. I mean Iran for example; Iran is in some ways threatened by the presence of U.S. troops there. And feels that it is in one way or another is being targeted.

And therefore it will continue to destabilize the situation in Iraq. So unless you have a framework solution that takes into account the effects of the changes in Iraq on each of these countries you are unlikely to get a long term genuine commitment to stabilizing the situation in Iraq.

At the same time changes in Iraq are not easily reversible, at least not in their broad outline.

So if you look at for example the empowerment of the Shiite community – this is unlikely to be reversed under any conditions in the sense that you can’t expect to go back to the status quo. So a solution will require a really very very pronounced commitment on the part of the United States…so a political and a diplomatic solution that would try to balance the changes in Iraq that are irreversible or that cannot be reversed without a great deal of turmoil inside the country.

Try to balance these with the interests of each of the regional powers and come up with a kind of optimized solution which may require I think the appointment of what I’ll call a super ambassador,who has enough power and enough skill to be able to negotiate or to calibrate the needed policy changes…

MB: Do you have anybody in mind for that role since the Bush administration seems to be looking around without too much success?

President Bush

AA: Well the Bush administration is looking for somebody who can coordinate the various elements of the current administration’s activities within Iraq. There’s a difference in a person who is trying to work out the conditions for a stable arrangement in the region as a whole. I mean the Bush administration is talking about a “War Czar”, a person who can coordinate for the Pentagon and State Department and so on. This is not what I’m talking about. I’m talking about a person who is really charged with coming up with a Peace Plan for the area that may end up with a kind of congress out of which a perhaps even a treaty may come out that would guarantee the political settlement in Iraq in a manner also that would get the nearby countries, the regional countries, to commit to supporting that which is basically a treaty obligation. Without that I think we would just be spinning our wheels until the next internal crisis.

MB: While you were traveling in Africa…Michael Bell – I assume you know him …. Either personally or of him….

AA: No I don’t personally know him.

MB: He’s the former chairman of the Fund for Reconstruction of Iraq, and he wrote while you were traveling… this is the first paragraph on what he wrote on April 30, he says,

“Last month, my term as Chairman of the donor committee for the International Construction Fund Facility for Iraq expired. And I left the job despondent. I have no real expectation that Iraq can be reconstituted as a viable entity whatever is done. Many of my colleagues, Iraqi and international, have privately shared that view for some time. We knew we were working in a glass bubble, isolating ourselves from the carnage on the ground. That sense of hopelessness weighs increasingly heavy.”

AA: Yes, I mean I suppose it’s a sentiment that is becoming greater and greater. I mean people are despairing that Iraq can be put together again. But you know nations are either put together because of the desires of their own population or because the region as a whole cannot accept a kind of dismemberment. So I think we have to find as it were a new formula that would allow both things to happen. That is, to see who want to maintain an Iraqi state inside Iraq. And so far, I think, the Kurds don’t But the Arab population, by and large, is still committed to some kind of geo-political unity. But they have an entirely different perspective on it.

MB: But does the new formula you mention – Confederal – does the new formula at least go in the direction of real autonomous states for the Kurds, the Shiites, the Sunnis? Of course in the Baghdad area, especially, everything is very integrated so you have to have some special arrangement for Baghdad…. But does it move in that direction in your view? Is that what the super ambassador would be…

AA: This is really the second best solution… The most likely solution that I think is possibly the most stable is some kind of Arab-Kurdish Federation. But for that to happen the Sunnis and the Shiites have to bury the hatchet. And again for that to happen you have to have a series of … not confidence building measures … but a series of constitutional measures that basically make it impossible to have sectarian based political parties – perhaps through some kind of threshold of votes in each province for a majority party to emerge.

I mean there are a number of constitutional arrangements you can do that. If that fails, if for one reason or another the depth of animosity between the two sects which has grown I think exponentially within the last two years, then I think that we have no choice but to go through a kind of multi-regional solution. But then again this multi-regional solution would have to be related to the security requirements of nearby countries so that it will not seen to be a threat to their own internal security.

MB: Well as the Americans debate how long we’re going to stay and under what conditions it also appears from many press reports that we’re building permanent bases in the desert – a great deal of funds seem to be allocated toward the building of a number of permanent bases, a huge embassy complex in the Green Zone…so even if American troops are drawn down, doesn’t it appear that America is planning to stay in your country for a very long time?

AA: Well, I mean the presence of large scale American investments or physical assets in any country doesn’t necessarily mean that they are going to be there forever. There are many cases when they just walked away from that. So this sum cost arguments doesn’t seem to hold when it comes to the political scene. The fact of the matter is that obviously the United States will have a very important say in Iraq’s domestic affairs as well as in terms of its own security in the area. So when I say that America is going to withdraw … I think they are going to withdraw the bulk of the military force. But the scale of their bases which were constructed some time ago, in 2004 and 2005, I think that the past that they have abandoned them without many tears being shed, so this is not an insurmountable problem.

James Baker

MB: All right, before we conclude, I want to go back to your main suggestion about a Super Ambassador — the person who comes to mind, being an American and having watched politics in the middle east for some time, there’s actually a person who fulfills that role and his name is James Baker. Do you think that he would be an appropriate Super Ambassador?

AA: I think so… if James Baker is available and he has the stamina to do it and he certainly has the type of profile. Another one would be Richard Holbrooke, but I don’t know either gentleman really so I can’t really speak for whether they would be available or not. But we need a person would has the diplomatic skills, the knowledge of the area, and understands the strategic implications of the various proposals… and then bring all of these together in some kind of final form which would then be sealed by an agreement or by treaty. And that would then pave the way for the changing the nature of the crisis.
I think it’s doable but it requires the United States to do it. And it requires the United States to make a 180-degree turn. Without it I think it doesn’t auger very well…

Richard Holbrook

MB: In view of American politics the two people you mentioned happened to be the one senior republican and the one senior democrat – we might need a bi-partisan team to pull this off.

AA: Well I can’t think of anybody else with those skills. But the person has to have the ear of the president but he also has to be specific mandate with a specific end state.

MB: Also while you were traveling another major player made some comments which startled many of us. This is from the Telegraph of two days ago: “A former commander of the British army has said that Britain and America should ‘admit defeat’ and withdraw from Iraq. General Sir Michael Rose also said, ‘he understood why insurgents were attacking coalition forces and said that he believed they were right to try and force invading troops out of the country.’ ”

As an American, I find that a startling comment coming from the former Commander of the British army. I wonder how you find it being there is London?

AA: Well I also find it extremely startling frankly, but it’s also becoming an increasingly common theme here. I mean the commander of British forces – I think Michael Rose was in charge of British forces also in Bosnia before …

MB: I believe that’s right.

AA: But it’s also a common feeling that there is an element of a self-fulfilling prophecy in all of this. The fact that you are there attracts some dissonance … and President Bush himself said that. If America would be invaded you’d defend it I suppose … But this is not really the full story I think behind the … in terms of defining the nature of the resistance as well as the legitimacy of the presence of foreign forces. I think you have to go beyond that really. It’s not just a question of whether the U.S. should pull out or not pull out or whether a surge will work or not, it’s what’s going to happen to this country and what kind of end state that we expect both as Iraqis and I suppose as people from the area and the Untied States now that its got itself involved in this part of the world…

MB: Now you yourself were an important minister just a few years ago. You were, I believe… Which ministries did you hold a few years ago?

AA: I was Minister of Defense and Minister of Finance.

MB: Alright. And why did you decide to leave politics and spend your time writing a book instead?

AA: Because I think politics took a dramatically wrong turn in 2005 and 2006 when it became based on sectarian parties. Once you had sectarian parties you have to ask yourself what is it that made these sectarian parties to aspire to? I mean the Kurds are an ethnic party and they certainly aspire to a nation state. So there is an element of political justification for being an ethnic-based party if you are seeking a national state. But to be a sectarian based party in an environment where sectarianism has been abolished constitutionally implies that you also have a ruling program of the sect. But there is no ruling program for sects. There are only ruling programs for nations. And once you achieve a nationhood status then there are ruling programs for different political and economic ideologies. So the wrong turn that Iraqi politics took in the summer of 2005 made it clear to me that there is no room for a person who doesn’t believe in sectarian politics.

I believe that Iraq is a sectarian state and needs to be drastically reformed. And the arrogance of sectarianism has to be removed. And important institutions established to stop sectarianism. But once this is done, there is no justification for a sectarian based party. Especially if it is a Shia majority party because the only Shia political perspective beyond removing injustice against them is something like an Islamic state which I don’t and most Iraqis don’t want. So it was the wrong turn.

And now we have a sectarian based government that basically ends up being in the control of sectarian based parties who maintain these kind of animosities for personal and very narrow objectives. So there is no room for a very different kind of politics but we’ll have to wait and see to find out if this is at all possible.

MB: Well if I understand what you just told me – actually it was a cousin of yours who was a prime minister some years ago and was pursuing different policies in a non-sectarian approach so apparently you were much more supportive of what was happening in those years than when your cousin was the prime minister.

AA: Well not necessarily. I don’t see eye to eye with him because it’s true he does not have a sectarian agenda but he follows in trying to establish a kind of national security state…a state that depends on strong security institutions and intelligence institutions. It’s a perspective that I don’t share with him. Anyway…

MB: Well Mr. Allawi, thank you so much. This is Mark Bruzonsky in Washington. We’ve been talking to Ali Allawi in London, the author of the book The Occupation of Iraq.