Gareth Stansfield Interview

Pages: 1 2

Gareth Stansfield Interview #1:
Interview #2:

Gareth Stansfield Book

Gareth Stansfield Interview
06/19/2007

“Federalism is the way that you maintain
the Iraqi state. If you really want to break
it up, then you attempt to impose a unitary
centralized government against which
different political forces within Iraq would
come into conflict…”
- Gareth Stansfield speaking from London

The following Goals for Americans Foundation Interview with Gareth Stansfield, International expert on Iraq & author, was conducted by Mark Bruzonsky on June 19th, 2007.

Gareth Stansfield Spotlight Interview

This is Mark Bruzonsky (MB) in Washington and were speaking to Gareth Stansfield (GS) who is in London. Mr. Stansfield is the author of a recent Briefing Paper called Accepting Realities in Iraq and the author of a book about Iraq and the author of an important article in the Prospect Magazine last year called Divide and Heal.MB: Mr. Stansfield, thank you so much for joining me today.

GS: Its a pleasure, thank you.

MB: The title of your article in the Prospect, Divide and Heal, thats really what Id like to talk to you about. Youve reached the conclusion that Iraq needs to be recreated in a sense, in a Federal form…divide and then heal. Could you elaborate on that a bit with an emphasis on what you think the American government should know in order to come forward with better policies?

GS: Yes indeed. I think the idea is firstly built upon an understanding of Iraq, that while its not necessarily pre-determined that it will succumb to dictatorship it is predisposed to it its current territorial construct. And that explains the rise of certain dictatorships that culminated in Saddam. Now with the removal of the dictatorship, we had what was in effect a chaotic devolution of power…down to localities to those groups who were best placed to project that power which became governed by particular identities, Shiites, Kurds, what have you…whether the western powers like that or not.
So the idea of divide and heal is simply to accept the reality thats on the ground now in Iraq. And that reality is that power is held locally, that security is managed locally and that it cannot be enforced by some overarching state power. And if that is accepted then it becomes necessary to construct stretches of administration and governance at the more local or regional level that represent and reflect those local trends.

Federalism is the way that you maintain
the Iraqi state. If you really want to break
it up, then you attempt to impose a unitary
centralized government against which
different political forces within Iraq would
come into conflict…

With that in place you can then have a system whereby Iraqi is administered politically in I suppose some form of federal…well not even federal system at this point, but in terms of localities. And then these groups, perhaps after a period of time have the choice to decide whether they want to stay part of Iraq or not, and then we get for the first time in the history of modern Iraq a consensus, if this happens, that the Iraqi state can exist and it has popular mandate to do so.

If it happens, then terrific, if it doesnt then the international community needs to respect the decisions of those regions that decide not to be part of the Iraqi state and to work with them to stabilize them in their own future.

The chances are is that these regions if given the chance after a period of stability, would choose to remain as part of Iraq. There are many benefits to being part of a larger state in an environment such as the Middle East. And it would also be a very rich state with the oil wealth available and would have the benefits of being in a large state that are simply not available from being in a small state.

But to get to that position first, you have to have a mechanism that allows communities to feel comfortable, allows local expression to be heard and not to be bombed out of existence,…needs to allow communities to feel comfortable with their neighbors, and then needs these communities to decide in a proactive sense that they actually do want this larger construct to exist.

But thats a long process and it ultimately would result in a federal Iraqi state, one that where the regions are the most powerful forces within the state and the government, the central government, is in effect quite weak but has defined duties to perform.

The position of the U.S. in this would be very interesting. In some ways this is not so dissimilar to the process in designing the current Iraqi constitution, whereby regions can form from three governorates. And that, to my mind, the U.S. government and the U.K. government have been astonishingly poor at pushing the constitution of Iraq seeing that they put and invested so much effort into it politically….

MB: Why do you think that is, cause as you are suggesting, we put so much effort into that Constitution, the Constitutional mechanism is there, and as you say, the U.S. and the U.K. have not pursued it.

GS: Firstly, I think the Federal aspect of the Constitution was initially put in in order to placate the Kurds. Because quite simply, you would not get the approval of the Kurdish parties if you did not have Federalism in it. And then I think there was a hope that it would simply go away as the Kurds were the only ones who supported it. But then certain prominent Shia parties expressed their support of it as do some Sunni groups as well.

So I think this has taken the U.S. by surprise. There are still foreign service staffers within the U.S. and the U.K. who view Federalism in Iraq as something that would ultimately result in the breakup of the state. Where arguably, it should be viewed the other way around. That Federalism is the way that you maintain the Iraqi state. If you really want to break it up, then you attempt to impose a unitary centralized government against which different political forces within Iraq would come into conflict with including the Kurds and the Shia, tribal groups, whatever. They will all come into conflict with a strong unitary state. Whereas if they had some ownership, some power themselves and some authority in office, then the central state is no longer really be an issue, it then becomes a partnership. So Federalism should be viewed in that sort of way.

And the U.S. and the U.K. are particularly important in allowing Federalism to work with their own experiences as Federal entities themselves and with evolved power. They could do a lot good diplomatic work, especially in the Middle East in the Arab world and in the Islamic world in explaining to let’s say Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and other states in the sub-continent about what federalism is, the importance of about what Federalism is, why its a system that is designed to protect the integrity of the states to some extent, and it shouldnt be seen as a threat. And a very proactive, diplomatic campaign to do that would, I think, pay dividends. And bringing in other states on board which are also federal, such as the United Arab Emirates, such as India, to use, I suppose, as success stories about how Federalism can be used as a means to protect the integrity of states. And the UAE is particularly good as an Arab state that is Federal.

MB: Youve used the term radical federalism to describe your proposal for Iraq. What does radical add to this?

GS: I think its radical in an Iraqi sense. Iraq has been…under Saddam it was obviously a very unitary style state. Its also radical in a sense that its, I suppose…its radical in that it would be in some ways asymmetric, as the the Iraqi Constitution does allow an asymmetric form of federalism to develop with different relationships that exist between different regions and the center which is not unheard of asymmetric federalism is a complex way of organizing state but its one that does exist.

Baghdad could quite easily become
the equivalent of Washington D.C.
within an Iraq state whereby it has
different values within the federal
structure than any of the States of
the Union have.

It would be radical in terms of how oil is redistributed across the states and thats radical in I suppose a Middle East sense, whereby it would be distributed on a per capita basis between regions. So I think that there are all sorts of innovations that can take place in Iraq that would make a federal system work. It would be a unique form of federalism - I suppose that would be why its radical as well. But then every form of federalism is unique. There are no identical models.

MB: Thats true. The regions in Iraq are fairly defined but the central city of Baghdad which has a large percentage of Iraqs population that has always been very much a mixed city youve got the various ethnic groups… How do you propose to… How does Baghdad fit into your proposal for radical federalism?

GS: Well I think that there is a chicken and egg situation going on with the mixes in Iraq where the opponents of federalism say that you cannot… if you create regions you would then be promulgating ethnic cleansing within Iraq or ethnic removals and killings because the regions would seek to homogenize themselves. But I think the opposite has… I think what were seeing now is that that process is happening anyway without the regions actually forming. Were seeing brutal massive ethnic removals going on in Baghdad and Kirkuk, and Mosul and even in Basra. So its not the case that one is going to cause the other the ethnic problems have started already.

Now that is going to be brutal and bloody and I think the U.S. and the International Community does have a role to play in insuring that a transition to a federal structure manages these problems. And weve had experience in managing these sorts of issues in the form of Yugoslavia. Again, weve been there.

It terms of how to manage crisis such as Baghdad. First we have to accept realities on the ground again. In Baghdad, there is a Shia majority in that city. It is no longer a Sunni city as many Sunni Arabs would claim. Its a Shia city. And that changes things markedly.

Similarly in Kirkuk, the reality on the ground is that its a Kurdish city. In Mosul its divided between Kurds and Arabs. These are very difficult things to accept especially if you are from the community that youre the other side and telling them the other side actually has a majority there. But it does help in the process of developing structures for managing them.

The surge has not resulted in the securing
of Baghdad. Its actually strengthened the
political legitimacy of Moqtada al Sadr.
Its strengthened the fighting cause of…
Al Qaeda.., and…if anything its further
weakened the power of the Iraqi military.
It simply has not succeeded.

I think in situations such as Baghdad in particular there could be strategies for internationalizing cities or making special mandates in particular cities, and thats where you have a very heavy presence while the process is deciding where they are located and the federation is decided. But..I mean for example, Baghdad could quite easily become the equivalent of Washington D.C. within an Iraq state whereby it has different values within the federal structure than any of the States of the Union have.

So there are different models as well there, but I think that we have to start off with a reflection of the realities that are there. And in some ways Baghdad has gone to the Shia already but we have to take into account the sensitivity of that situation and ultimately look toward different strategies to managing the conflict particularly in Baghdad, maybe also in Kirkuk although I think Kirkuk has already gone down the road to being Kurdified.

MB: If you had a chance to talk to American officials at the State Department, at the White House, what would you suggest to them they should actually do in the next few months? And how would you evaluate their current policies?

GS: Well I think that in terms of evaluating their current policies, I think firstly…you cannot fight socially based movements with military power as they are currently trying to do in Baghdad. They are trying to fight, particularly the Sadrists and often the insurgents with military force and you simply cannot do this. These are political and social problems that have to be handled in ways that are sensitive to those origins. And I think the surge has failed … has caused violence to emerge in other places in which weve seen this terrible bomb go off in Baghdad today as well.

MB: What are you expecting this surge policy and this increased military policy is going to result in?

GS: Well it will result in further radicalization of both the Shia and the radical Sunni camps. That… Al Qaeda is being strengthened in Iraq at this point. So yes the logistical and I suppose the operational sense I suppose of Al Qaeda is back on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. And there has been a regrouping of Al Qaeda in a very real way there. But the inspirational side for Al Qaeda is now Iraq. This is where its young fighters are going to get politicized, gain their experience, and where they get their propaganda victories as well. And we have seen their influxes of fighters coming back into Iraq from outside and theyre getting strengthened, but also they are becoming more and more popular in Iraq as well.
We hear the U.S. military talking about the tribes going over to the military and that sort of thing. But the tribes will go over to whoever pays them the most. And I think the more military that you put into Baghdad, the more killing that the U.S. military does of Shias and Sunnis, then the more radicalized they become against the U.S. and to each other. So it becomes a…I suppose…a circle of violence and hate having the military there.

MB: Well it sounds like you are suggesting that the policies the U.S. are pursuing are achieving the exact opposite results of what the U.S. says it wants to achieve.

GS: Yes, I think thats fair enough. I think that the surge has not resulted in the securing of Baghdad. Its actually strengthened the political legitimacy of Moqtada al Sadr. Its strengthened the fighting cause of the Al Qaeda unit, and it hasnt…if anything its further weakened the power of the Iraqi military. It simply has not succeeded.

I think then the strategy is one whereby, you have to take the things that you have on the ground, and you have the Constitution that these political parties are still trying to follow. There are definite benefits if you are a Sunni Arab leader that’s not connected to Al Qaeda to start to work with the Iraqi government and particularly start to look toward what federalism brings to your region.

For example, its simply wrong to say that there is no oil in Sunni Arab regions. There is oil in Sunni Arab regions, it just has not yet been exploited. And if you get that message across, and say that of course this fits within a wider framework of whats happening across the whole of Iraq, then you benefit as well as managing to govern your own territory, then it starts to look like a very attractive package. Particularly if you get the idea across that this is not about breaking up Iraq. This is about maintaining the integrity of Iraq.

So I think that that sort of approach by the U.S. and the U.K. of explaining what devolved power actually means then and the benefits of devolved power for particular local power holders, it would be a profound and very proactive move to make rather than flooding the streets with soldiers and turning people towards Al Qaeda or the Mahdi.

MB: Well in two months, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are scheduled to testify before the Congress of the United States at a very uneasy and skeptical time here in Washington. From what youve said, they’re not going to have a lot of positive to report and the political pressures are growing considerably here in terms of withdrawal of American troops. What is it if you were asked to testify in a panel at the same time what you would say to the Americas Congress about what the United States should specifically start doing?

GS: They should start undertaking far more… Well first of all there should be an acceptance that to deal with local problems in Iraq you have to have local solutions. So rather than sending in the Iraqi military or the U.S. military all over the place, you have to start working with people on the ground in securing neighborhoods and localities even if that means working with Sunnis with Sunnis, Shia with Shia or Kurds with Kurds. The idea that youre going to impose some kind of central security is now wrong. So you have to go down to that basic level. Once you do that, you can have a…perhaps have a local security being developed, you then have to start pushing the idea in the Constitution itself, of federalism, of regions, and what that means, of how it protects the integrity of Iraq, with how it brings resources and revenues to localities as well.

I think that there has to be much bigger emphasis on social issues and localities rather than the national level politics.

MB: It doesnt seem like the current government of Iraq wants to move in this direction. So how in the world…how to bring about something that sounds so reasonable and yet all of the parties that are in control seem to be resisting it?

GS: Well it depends on which party you look at. I mean the Kurdish parties obviously have their interest in promoting this sort of line that ends up in federalism… (beep beep) Sorry I think that my phone is about to die… The Shia parties and critically The Supreme Council have expressed their support for federalism as has fedillia(?) You then only got groups such as Moqtada al Sadr and some of the ultra nationalist Sunni parties that are opposed to this and that is where the work obviously needs to be done.

But the work on those guys needs to be done by other Iraqis. It needs to be done by the Kurds. It needs to be done by the Supreme Council, by tribes and supporters of this rather than Americans doing it.

Where Americans can actually help is by going to the regions, by explaining this problem, by explaining that federalism is not a precursor to the division of Iraq, that its not some Zionist plot to create new states, and creating a regional context whereby the Iraqi domestic councils feels that they can make these moves toward federalism without incurring the wrath of Saudi Arabia or Iran.

MB: This is Mark Bruzonsky in Washington, were talking with Gareth Stansfield in London. Mr. Stansfield, thank you very much for this very insightful discussion. I hope that we can have part 2 of this sometime in the weeks ahead when youve got your battery charged up.

GS: Great. Thank you very much.

MB: Thank you.

Biographical Information:Gareth Stansfield is reader in Middle East Politics at the Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter and associate fellow of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London. He is one of the few academics to have resided in Iraq for an extended period of time in the late 1990s. He lived in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1997 and 2001 working in Erbil and Suleimaniyah where he was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to advise the Kurdistan Regional Government(s) on humanitarian policy issues. Between 2002-2004, he held a Leverhulme Special Research Fellowship at the University of Exeter. During this period, he studied the political reconstruction of Iraq, and particularly the affairs of Shii and Sunni parties and organizations. His current research is on the political development of post-Saddam Iraq and particularly the interaction of religious and ethnic groups. His research focus is particularly upon the applicability of federal structures to Iraq, and comparative analyses of consociational systems of governance.He has briefed and advised several governments on Iraqi and Kurdish politics, including those of the UK, USA, Switzerland, and South Korea. He has given many guest lectures in universities and think-tanks across Europe, the Middle East.Dr Stansfield has published extensively on the subject of Iraqi and Kurdish politics. His publications include, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? with L Anderson (New York: Palgrave, 2004), Governing Kurdistan: The Strength of Division, in B OLeary, J McGarry, K Saleh (eds.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Assessment of Constitutional Models Suitable for Building Representative Government in a Unified Multi-Ethnic Iraq, in Aspects of Institutional Development in Iraq (Ottawa: Forum of Federations, 2003), The Kurdish Dilemma: The Golden Era Threatened, in T Dodge & S Simon (eds.) Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change. International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper no. 354.Dr Stansfield’s most recent book is Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press) and he is currently completing A History of Kurdistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Pages: 1 2