Gareth Stansfield Interview

Interview #2

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MB: This is Mark Bruzonsky in Washington and we’re speaking again with Gareth Stansfield in London.There’s two questions that I’ve been wanting to ask you and I’m glad to have the opportunity. The United States is building not just an embassy in Baghdad but a fortress embassy that is ten times bigger than any other embassy in the world including the new one we’re building in Beijing. Five thousand people are going to be working there. It gives every impression of being a government within a government – as I said ten times bigger than any other embassy in the world. What are your views on that and what are your views on the ability of the United States to continue that kind of a presence in Iraq.

GS: I think it does clearly show what the, certainly there is he real strategy that is being followed by the US administration whereby, okay, Iraq is sovereign but there is still going to be an attempt to project an overwhelming influence politically over the successive governments of Iraq. And as you said five thousand people there
all have jobs to do and you can imagine that there will be regulars at the ministry of oil and the Prime Minister’s office, etc. It’s quite clear to see how this would work.

But also I think we need to look at the military bases. The US military bases in Iraq are huge installations that…I would imagine are enduring as well.

So I think there is, even though we may see a drawdown of absolute numbers of forces, I think we are going to see a very strong political presence but also a very notable military presence as well.

But to what avail is this? I mean I really question the ability of any outside power to be able to influence the events on the ground…there is…in the forthcoming years whether that’s with a political presence outside the embassy or with military bases outside the major towns.

MB: Well you mention the military bases and the strategy seems to be at some point the United States will reposition its troops, withdraw them from the cities, claim that Iraq is on the road to some kind of stability, and the Iraqi forces have to do the job, but it looks as if we are very intent on imposing a presence of 40-50,000 American troops on what are essentially permanent American cities.

GS: I would agree fully. I think the tons of the bases and the new bases being built as well. For example I think there’s one report that one is being planned for Mahmur (name uncertain) which is between Baghdad and Irbil. These are very sizeable installations that would be’.we know all too well in the U.K. that American military bases tend to stick around for a long time. And I think the indications would be that these bases would be enduring ’ that they would be homes to many thousands of American personnel that would have the ability to maintain an aggressive posture if they have to and I think do indicate some greater plan that is to be able to project American military might into the 21st century.

MB: A few weeks ago in fact, out of the blue, both the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense all used the analogy of South Korea. That’why shouldn’t we have permanent facilities there? You know, we’ll agree with the government just like we did in South Korea and we’ll have these forces but the country will pursue its own policies. Do you think the South Korean analogy makes any sense?

GS: No I don’t. I mean the South Korean analogy is highly flawed and the situation in Korea at the time when the American military presence was there was really quite different. There had been a major major conflict where the U.N. was also involved in which had never been formally resolved. And it was in a different geo-political setting and in a different period in terms of its relation to the cold war that was looming and the post World War II environment as well.

I just don’t think we have those conditions in Iraq at this point. And more importantly, we also have the fact that…I would say…most Iraqis outside the Kurdish areas would not welcome that sort of presence either. Even if the government said that they should have it, I’m not at all sure that it would be a popular decision by any means. I just don’t see it as being’the only way it would be sustainable would be through the use of military power rather than anything else.

MB: Well as you know in September, just a few months from now, the Congress is going to hold public hearings on all of these issues including the permanent bases, including this massive embassy. If you had a chance in just a few minutes to sum up in front of the Congress in public your views…what our policy should be as opposed to what our policy is’what would you tell the Senators and Congressmen?

GS: I think the idea of attempting to impose some sort of position onto the Iraqi government without huge diplomatic exertion, through an embassy or through military threats is flawed. And it’s flawed firstly because I think an Iraqi sovereign government cannot act as thought it is doing what the U.S. wants. But secondly it’s flawed because it’s presuming that the Iraqi government itself has the ability to do what the US government wants. And I think the framework for understanding and for developing policy on Iraq is just wrong. And it’s wrong because we’re basing it upon the idea of a structure that it simply is not there…and by that I mean the Iraqi state. I think that we have to recognize that there is, in fact, a failed state with lots of different power holders and instead the United States needs to find a structure by which to work with people who hold power now in Iraq rather than those with whom they would want to hold power.

It is a big task that the U.S. has ahead of it as it moves in that direction, but it’s not going to get very far if it simply ignores it.

MB: Do you think the bases should actually be closed and the embassy should be greatly scaled back?

GS: Um….I think that there is a need for bases but I think that it needs to be thought through exactly what the purposes of these bases would be’.and how they would be best situated. If the purpose of bases is to provide some form or semblance of security in particular regions then that’s one thing. If it is to actually act as a deterrent to al Qaeda, to radical Shias, and to Iran’then it should be realized that that is simply not going to work.

MB: That is the purpose, isn’t it?

GS: Well then it’s simply a non-starter. It will have a….as we’ve seen in Iraq…the presence of American forces simply acts as a magnet for al Qaeda and serves to radicalize the Shia and bring in the involvement of Iran as well.

MB: Well, let’s talk about Iran for a moment because that is what’s central to what’s going on here in Washington now. Over the weekend, Pat Buchanan…you’ll remember he goes back to the Nixon days when he was in the Nixon White House’he publicly said on national TV…expect an attach on Iran by September. ElBaradei came out a few days later and said it’s madness to be talking about an attack on Iran. What are your views?

GS: Well I think that there is a very strong and noisy group of people in Washington that wants to see an attack on Iran take place. But I think it would be the most nonsensical action to take. Iran is a very different place than Iraq. It has the ability to secure its regime in all sorts of ways that Saddam didn’t. And you also do have a very coherent sense of nationhood that you didn’t necessarily have in Iraq to start with.

On top of that, if you do attack Iran, then Iran has the capacity inside Iraq to really make the U.S. position there totally untenable. And it’s nearly there already, but Iran could really put it over the edge. And they’re playing with forces in the region that have the ability to seriously damage the U.S.

MB: Have you seen the article by Norman Podhoretz in Commentary Magazine in which he specifically and loudly insists that that’s what we must do ’ attack Iran and bring Iran…either regime change through an attack or at least destroy all of their military capabilities?

GS: No I haven’t seen that but it’s a…I think it’s a common mind of thinking by a lot of the right wing analysts within the U.S. And it beggars belief that after going through what they went through … what they’re going through in Iraq…that they still believe that American military power can achieve some form of regime change that would be deemed beneficial to the US. At this point it’s just astonishing that they’re so short sighted in this way.

MB: I gather that you agree then with Mr. ElBaradei that this is madness to be talking about this kind of attack.

GS: Yes, absolutely. I just things it’s uh…from whatever viewpoint you look at this from, the chances of the U.S. achieving what it wants to achieve by an attack are pretty pretty remote. But the likelihood that they will get further damaged in Iraq and that they will destabilize the Gulf and even the wider Middle East with Iran’s connection through to Hezbollah and Lebanon are very very significant indeed.

MB: One final question then… How does the Arab Israeli conflict… how does the situation with the Palestinians intersect in your view with these policies vis-’-vis Iraq and Iran?

GS: Um…that’s a good question. I think until recently it was always possible to say that the primary emotive issue in the minds of – if you can say the Arab street — was Palestine. Um…but I think to some extent that that can be now challenged because of the huge amounts of, the huge atrocities that are being committed everyday in Iraq ’ that in some ways, the amazing has happened in that Palestine is being matched in terms of the brutality that has happened by Iraqi itself. And certainly in terms of the emotional aspects of it I think that’s very true. Is it possible to separate…? I think to some extent, but Palestine remains a festering sore that not only shows…that not only has Palestinians suffering brutalities of occupation and also now the problem of civil war among themselves. But shows to the Arab side American perfidy, double-standards, hypocrisy. That means that their actions will be rarely trusted until that situation is resolved.

MB: Well it looks like Mr. Blair is going to be going over as a special envoy…so…do you think he’s going to have much success? Or much credibility for that matter?

GS: Quite frankly, no. I mean, his involvement in the war in Iraq has sullied his position in Muslim communities. And I think that its…he’s simply not the right person right now to be undertaking that job.

MB: Well from what I know of your politics over there in England, a lot of people are going to be glad that he’s going to be going somewhere else.

GS: Yeah….most of all Gordon Brown I would say.

(Laughter)

MB: Well, this is Mark Bruzonsky in Washington. We’re talking with Gareth Stansfield, the author of the book, IRAQ and the author of a Chatham House Report about the situation in Iraq. Thank you very much for discussing these critical issues with us.

GS: Thank you.

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