Laith Kubba Interview

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On March 14, Mark Bruzonsky (MB) met with Laith Kubba (LK) to discuss the past and the future of Iraq.

Transcript of Interview With Laith Kubba

“I argue strongly that the US still has enough clout and influence to lead a conference or to back Turkey to lead a conference of Iraq’s neighbors by which they need to reach an agreement on putting Iraq back filling the vacuum and putting Iraq back on the map. What does that entail?”

MB An exceedingly important subject, the future of Iraq. Many people…have felt that the future is one of Federalism, that keeping Iraq a country at this point in history requires devolving power to the Provinces, to the Regions. And Mr. Kubba was just about to tell me (before we started this interview) that his first article on this subject was…

LK I think that the first time the Wall Street Journal ran, on the back page — I think it was a profile of me and Kenan Makiya. We both spoke on the need for decentralization in Iraq and I think it was going back maybe to March ‘91 or ‘92.

MB That far back – okay.

LK Yes – I can’t remember …but that was my first I think clear thought at that time why we needed decentralization. Things have changed a great deal but the principle, the key ideas, were we certainly need to decentralize from an administration point of view, you certainly need to give the local provinces a lot of room to administrate their local affairs. I think I also wrote a series of four op-ed pieces for the Financial Times - two just before the war and two just after the war. And on the first piece I was outlining a blueprint on what to do after the war and that was to start with elections at the local council level not at the national legislative level and then you build up to the province’s elections for a provincial council and government and then you go to the national level. At the ideal why? When we need to think on what is the most suitable structure for Iraq’s administration, we need to think of two sets of measures. One set of measure is to address the pressing and urgent needs that were born out of Saddam’s mismanagement and of the post-war mismanagement of Iraq. These sets of mismanagements have created enough tensions in the provinces between people that they need to be addressed, they’re part of the reality, they’re part of the politics. You need to take necessary measures to ease that tension and to diffuse potential conflict. That is one track. One needs to think about a response to the pressure of today’s reality. But then we need to take a different.., we need to change our mind set and look ahead. If we did not have these pressures, in an ideal world how do we see? Let us assume we diffuse these pressures, let us assume we manage the country well. Ideally what sort of an administrative structure Iraq should have? And here you cannot escape by looking at it. As you see the country culturally it’s more or less divided into two and geographically it is also divided into two, you see a mountain area …

MB … Well, even more than two, it’s really more than two - it’s really divided into four even if you …..Baghdad with its own special relationship.

LK The way I look at it as I said without looking at the cities… Reall the big historical picture… You will see a mountain area predominately Kurds… has other minorities with their own languages, the Asyrians, the Caldanians the Turkemans…but basically it’s a mountain terrain as you can see it’s culturally and geographically distinct from the rest of the country. Then we see the plateau, like the valley of two rivers which you can see… you can “Google it’…you can look at it as a flat land two rivers. Arab culture, predominately Arab culture. Of course it has others. It has Serbians and Mendenians…

MB …and Chaldians, even had Jews up until….

LK Absolutely. But it’s predominantly Arab culture and you see…ok…so this is roughtly what the country is. And you can see that the interests of the people living on that land are best integrated. Of course if they have one united market, one economy, integrated economy…they live in a neighborhood where Turkey is a big country on the north…massive seventy to eighty million booming booming economy. Iran is a Turkey country on the east…massive…seventy to eighty million with ambition to expand. And then you have the gulf states. Saudi Arabia is rich … influential, and the whole gulf is extremely rich. And you can see that the interests of those people they need to integrate get themselves together. But as they try to get themselves together naturally they want to share interests but also they want to keep a level of autonomy because there are areas of differences. But there is a collective interest binding them together.

Now I cannot argue for the Kurds because they have a strong national sentiment, and nationalism transcends even self-interest. Nationalism comes from the heart not from the mind and what they see currently is a strong tendency that they want their own statehood…to control their own destiny. Whether they would ultimately say this would mean inside Iraq or outside Iraq is very much their right and I think that’s for them to decide. But I can tell you what makes sense for the rest of Iraq.

MB Ok.

LK From Mosul to Basra, 80% of that population is primarily tribal Arab; another 20% maybe is urbanized but with heavy tribal roots in it. Those tribes throughout history have converted naturally…like not with a formal conversion. They move from one sect to the other because unlike Iran or Turkey the Arabs of Iraq do not adhere to these sects in a very dogmatic way. They roughly see them as being of the same religion and all the Imams of the Shias and Sunnis are buried within them and the tradition of inter-marriage is so real and the tradition of conversion is no big deal. You see one family which is a Sunni family — their son becomes a Shia – absolutely no deal. They joke about it as well.

MB Wasn’t…But is it now!

LK It is now. That’s what I’m saying. When I look at …that’s the reason I am differentiating between two modes of thinking. One mode tells you we have pressing needs, you absolutely need to address them now otherwise you have more Iraq and you have no patient to look after. And the other one wants that patient recovered. What does that patient need? And that’s a different mode of thinking. I’m aware we need to think with both hats or minds at the same time and we need to navigate our way out of it.

So looking at the big picture the last eight years at the geography at the culture…as I said I would not be disturbed to see the Kurds arguing that their region is so autonomous, so fragile, so independent, that is their call. But I can see it makes sense for that region because of the language because of the geography and because of the strong nationalism. I can see it.

MB And it weren’t for Turkey, Syria and Iran they probably would do this… But….

LK Yes, absolutely, if it wasn’t for that, that’s what they want, and as I said…I personally do not have a problem with it. It makes sense. And I think there will be let’s call Arab Iraq, and Kurdish Iraq, they would be the closest to deal and trade with and have cultural exchanges and programs with Arab Iraq…again for a variety of reasons. But for the Arab side of Iraq, it’s just the geography, the economic viability and the history — all of it does not lend it to be seen, other than, more or less, like one entity with different structures. You can have different structures of administrating it.

MB But considerable federalism is what you are arguing for, considerable devolution of power, money, resources to the provinces.

LK Well…let me just build into it slowly to explain. So as I said, I’m waiting… like long-term it makes sense to build institutions that will keep that entity close because the…after all it’s an economic battle and more or less a national struggle with the neighbors, you need to stay strong, you need to staya block, you need to have good economy, you need to integrate your resources, your roads, whatever you’ve got to survive.

Now and again I’m saying that the relationship with the Kurdish region under current conditions is bound to be Federal. They have a very high level of autonomy. But for the rest of Iraq it would make perfect sense strategically to try to put it together as one because that would serve their interests best. The interest of everybody who is in this land. The issue of religion, Shia/Sunni, you will find both Shias and Sunnis are happy. Again, I’m bypassing the current tension just for the moment. But to think that strategically, the Shias will be assured to have Sunni’s in the country to put a brake on those who want to pressure Iraq to become a religious Shia country. And the Shias would put a break on the Sunni’s who want to pressure Iraq to become a religious Sunni country. Because believe me, a lot of Iraqi’s while they respect religion, they do not want the clergy to rule – they just don’t. They are emotionally as frightened of the Shia religious groups and there are Sunnis frightened of it. And there are a lot of Sunnis frightened that if they are left alone a tiny place they would be so much pressured by Saudi money or others that they would be religious influences too strong to control because they ‘ll come with money.

MB Plus the Iranian influence of course.

LK That’s the third factor again on the national interest. If the Shias of Iraq can stay together and accommodate the Sunnis and they can stay in power. They don’t need to go to Iran to help them stay in power. They are on their own – on their own feet. Why should they go to Iran which is culturally different? Why should they deny themselves access to gulf money and Arab money and markets if they can? It just strategically it makes sense to both. And for the Sunnis as I said, their concerns can be accommodated if there is no religious government in Baghdad…Shia religious government…if the Shia government in Baghdad is not aligned to Iran, and being Shia then doesn’t frighten them as much as Iran’s influence or a religious government influence.

So strategically I would argue it is in the Arab of Iraq interest and I would argue also it is a viable and feasible testimony of history — and I can argue that the mismanagements took a long time before they…Saddam pushed Iraq and used the differences to stay in power. But then the post-war has made it much worse. Remember in April ’03 when Saddam fell, not a single person was killed by sectarian crimes - not one. Not in ’04. The first sectarian killing started in Iraq was by Al Qaida. It was by people… volunteers coming from Algeria from countries who do not know Iraq who started killing Shias. And yes any country you have car bombs that have killed 50,000, 60,000 in your neighborhood and you do not know what to do about it..

MB And you were in government then?

LK Yes

MB You were the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister…

LK Yes, again, we met the Sunnis and we knew what was happening but we just couldn’t stop it. But my point is you have a determined enemy who wants to stir up this and they’ve ultimately, when they blew up the two shrines there was a spillover and people said, “Enough” and it was very unfortunate. But this goes against historical currents. Those two shrines stayed there1,000 years, untouched. Ask the question – why?

There is a testimony that – look these countries are committing by the way mentioning the Jewish community and those who — I was raised in Baghdad. I was raised in a neighborhood where three of our neighbors were Jews.

MB It was a very vibrant Jewish community…until the ‘50s I think.

LK But I promise you … there’s guy in London, his name is Sammi Zubeida, he’s an Iraqi Jew, and whenever we meet and we talk to him we cannot think of him…I cannot think with my…other than him being an Iraqi. I just cannot. I mean, whatever he believes, in… I just cannot think because he is an Iraqi. He was raised there. He interacted with our lives, and he is just as much an Iraqi as I am. And the same goes for the Sunnis and the people who are part of this national vibrant city are just Iraqis. Of course you have currents and you have polarizations and you can focus, bring overland lights on some side show and magnify it and make it big. But that is not the historical current of that country. The historical current basically people accommodate. It’s just the way it is. They are moderate even in their religious views. And the religious establishment, unlike Iran, stayed off of politics. Najaf is historically known… People rally to Najaf when there is a crisis. But if there is no crisis, Najaf does not interfere with how the country is run. So this is what I am referring to as the cultural norm, the history, you look at the big picture – this is what the country should be.

Now where the country is at the moment is at extreme. It is so much off its natural comfortable balanced position. And my concern is that we must not institutionalize that exceptional moment. We must take a lesson, we must look at opportunity to readjust and make it right but not to institutionalize everything about it. What is right is to decentralize powers, but you only do it within a strategic thinking to bring the country back. As it recovers its health and heals its wounds and starts building itself there should not be obstacles from it becoming one integral market. As I said with the Kurds they have to decide what they want to do with their relationship with Iraq.

MB As our Foundation gets ready to weigh in on these issues. What specifically would you advise – what steps are now needed to create the new situation we are all trying to achieve? A peaceful and prosperous Iraq after the torment the country’s been through.

LK If you take what I’ve said as a more or less sound and acceptable view and then we have the end in mind to define clearly which will accommodate a Kurdish area…whatever works…but the rest of Iraq needs to be put together. Then I look today at today’s mess and there are many factors that we need to deal with them.

Iran has a huge influence inside Iraq today. Iran is pushing an agenda because of its own strategic interest and they are playing their chess game very well. They want the South of Iraq to be federated as one. That will make it it’s backyard, it will give them access to the gulf and it will make the Shias of Iraq who are predominately Arab so much dependent on Iran. And Iran doesn’t want to see Iraq as it was. Iraq waged a war against Iran for eight years – it was a threat. It’s more or less the only serious obstacle for Iran to become…expand its influence and become a dominant force in the Gulf region. And to have Iraq within the cards of Iran is very different from having Iraq independently sitting at the table maybe aligning itself, depending on whatever Iraq sees, in a different position. They don’t want that. And this strategy came clearly to me and I don’t say this with hostility to Iran, I say it objectively looking at how people think. And Iran is thinking as a force that wants to become dominant in the region — a regional power. And I don’t blame them if they want an opportunity to push and if they want to push they push and that is their right. But I would call on Iraq and Iraqis to know that others they push their agendas that does not serve the interest of that country. So I do want to brief Iraq against the Iranian pursuit. Going back to the question “what to do’?
Number 1 - I do have a big problem. I have a regional power that is pushing an agenda that does not serve my country. I have that as a problem.

MB And you have a superpower with 160,000 troops and 100,000 contractors.

LK I have a superpower which doesn’t know what to do. And that is my problem with that superpower. They walked in without clear plans, created a mess, and my concern is they simplify the question, “should we leave or should we stay”? And should we stay with what we’ve done this last year that brought improved security conditions in the short term has created a serious problem in the middle term. And that is, they’ve armed 80,000 people outside the government. There are 80,000 to 100,000 people receiving salaries from the U.S. Army, more or less Sunnis. It’s like a militia. Now when the U.S. Stops paying them salaries or leaves the country…

MB Or a different president decides on a different policy….

LK What are we going to do with 80,000 armed men?

MB Who don’t have any salaries anymore?

LK Yes, I mean it’s a serious thing, So yes, you bought peace by arming all these people. But that is so short term. So to me my second problem… So my first problem is I have Iran and my second problem…I have a country that initially came to help but creating some mess, it’s about to pull out and not knowing exactly, depending on the president who is going to come in, how to pull out…but I know pulling out will create a vacuum and I know prolonging their stay will not necessarily solve the problem.

MB The vacuum will be filled by the regional powers especially Iran plus the 80,000 Sunnis that have been armed, so it’s a bigger mess.

LK Absolutely… so we have a very serious problem. Now looking for solutions – I argue strongly I’ve been saying publicly in every place — I believe the U.S. should keep a leadership role, not necessarily a military role but certainly a leadership role. I argue strongly that the US still has enough clout and influence to lead a conference or to back Turkey to lead a conference of Iraq’s neighbors by which they need to reach an agreement on putting Iraq back filling the vacuum and putting Iraq back on the map. What does that entail? Turkey would sign on to that agreement, the Kurds would object because they don’t like Turkey getting closer. Iran would not sign on to that agreement unless they are forced to. And Turkey is a country you don’t mess about with. Turkey is not the US. And Iran I think will think a hundred times before picking up a confrontation with Turkey on Iraq. And I think if Turkey wants to lead an effort and if Saudi with all its money and influence is to sign into that effort and the US agrees to it, we have I think the US — I hope that the new administration adopts that approach — can lead an effort more or less to say if we agree then the local Iraqi players have no option other than to accept what we agree on. The Kurds have no option, the Shias have no option, and the Sunnis have no option.

MB Is there a role for the United Nations in this?

LK You can put a cover, a UN cover to it, but we know under the U.N. there must be basically… a leader.

MB You’re looking for US leadership to create the regional conditions so that the regional players won’t oppose this and at least will say it’s ok with us even though we’re not enthusiastic.

LK Well I hope of course, I know it’s not going to be easy, but I think we need to get, we need to make them part of the solution. They are currently a problem.

MB Do you think Miss Rice of the State Department is capable?

LK NO

MB It didn’t take you long to say that!

LK The reason being… I mean my view is this administration has dug so deep into an alternative course. It’s too late in the day to change course.

MB What about General Petraeus? Does he understand this dynamic, this larger construct?

LK I think to start with that idea was first flagged I think by the Baker/Hamilton report.

MB Yes it was.

LK And it was sidetracked and then an attempt was made independently by the US government to encourage the Iraqi government to do it, but the Iraqi government does not want the neighbors to come in. So it was sidetracked the second time. And I believe it is not within the powers of General Petraeus to do this. This is a political effort not military. All the meetings that are taking place in Iraq with the Iranians are of bilateral military in nature. They are not looking at the big picture where to take Iraq.

MB So who do you look to…in Washington where you’ve been quite awhile, you’ve had a lot of experience here.

LK Of course I look at the president because that requires a decision at the highest level to decide which direction to take. And as I said I don’t know who would…

MB You mean the next president ‘cause you’re clearly not looking to this one.

LK Yes, I think it’s too late in the day to expect anything from this administration on this. But a new president I think can work on that agenda. The US maintains a lead and relies on our NATO ally which is Turkey and strategic ally which is Saudi Arabia and a rival or a foe which is Iran which is not going to be easy. The most difficult element is Iran. Other neighbors can be brought to line. I mean Syria…Jordan, Kuwait. But an initiative…unless you draw a line and make sure that that line everybody signs to it you cannot start talking to the Iraqis because they would play the Americans, they play the Iranians, they play one against the other.

MB Play one party off against the other…one group in Washington against another, too.

LK That’s the reason the US needs to reach an agreement with the big players who can put cash and arms on the table. Each of the countries I named can put something concrete. The Iranians can influence the Shias. The Saudis can influence the Sunnis in a big way with their money in Iraq. And in Iraq, Turkey would influence the Kurds in a negative way i.e., the Kurds would do anything to avoid a bigger confrontation with Turkey. So, this is what I advocate…

MB And when you speak of alliances there are people in this country including our Foundation… We have run full page ads about the need for a bi-partisan approach in this country a real bi-partisan approach not what’s good for the Democrats, not for the Republicans, what’s good for the United States and a policy that would be supported rather than fracturing our political society. And this hasn’t caught on, this bi-partisan idea… There was a meeting in Oklahoma in January where a group of former Republicans and Democrats got together and Senator Boren and Bloomberg was there as well. But if we have a house divided here where one party is advocating X, the other party advocating Y, we’re all screaming at each other that is — it’s not going to be possible to do what you just outlined.

LK I think that is the reason under current conditions. I mean where everybody is holding their breath waiting for the next election to know which way the country will go. (knock at door…) …I’m afraid I have…

MB Well thank you so much this has been so insightful and we’re very appreciative and maybe we can have part 2 after I’ve had a chance to digest.